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Abstract
In view of events such as the public denial of climate change research by well-known politicians, the effects of postfactual
disinformation and emotionalisation are discussed for science. Here, so-called ‘fake news’ are of focus. These are con-
sidered problematic, particularly in a high-choice media environment as users tend to show selective behaviour. Much
research has demonstrated this selective exposure approach, which has roots in the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(Festinger, 1957). However, research on the processes of coping with dissonance is still considered sparse. In particu-
lar, communication scholars have overlooked emotional states and negotiations. This article analyses the affects that are
aroused when users are confronted with opinion-challenging disinformation and how they (emotionally) cope by using dif-
ferent strategies for online information. For this, we used the context of climate change that is widely accepted in Germany.
The innovative research design included pre- and post-survey research, stimulus exposure (denying ‘fake news’), observa-
tions, and retrospective interviews (n = 50). Through this, we find that perceptions and coping strategies vary individually
and that overt behaviour, such as searching for counter-arguments, should be seen against the background of individual
ideas and motivations, such as believing in an easy rejection of arguments. Confirming neuroscientific findings, partici-
pants felt relieved and satisfied once they were able to dissolve their dissonant state and negative arousal. Dissatisfaction
and frustration were expressed if this had not been accomplished.
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1. Introduction: Science Information Online
Several problems and threats for individuals and soci-
ety around the consumption of online information have
been recently debated. In view of events such as the
public denial of climate change research by well-known
politicians, the effects of disinformation are discussed.
However, disinformation should not be confused with
misinformation. The latter is information that is incorrect,
possibly given by accident, but not created with the in-
tention of causing harm, whereas disinformation means
intentionally false information that is often used for spe-
cific communication strategies, such as damaging the rep-
utation of a person, social groups, organisations or coun-
tries (cf. Garrett, 2017). Among these are so-called ‘fake
news.’ Although there is no universal understanding of
‘fake news,’ some aspects appear to be central: deliber-
ately false claims that are supposed to imitate the style
of conventional media reporting and to reach a certain
public (Gelfert, 2018; Zimmermann & Kohring, 2018; see
also Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.; First Draft, n.d.)
Facing the fact that we live in a high-choice me-
dia environment, their existence is considered problem-
atic. It is assumed that users confirm their own opinions
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many times over, regardless of whether they are scien-
tifically founded or socially established (so-called con-
firmation bias). Expectations of ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser,
2011), ‘information cocoons’ (Sunstein, 2018), or ‘echo
chambers’ (Sunstein, 2001) raise concerns about narrow-
minded online users and societal fragmentations and po-
larisations. However, at the same time—and this is often
forgotten—it is highly likely that users will come into con-
tact with online content that contradicts or challenges
their own attitudes. The enormous diversity of opinions,
values, and beliefs presented online allows for a much
higher proximity to opposing opinions through users’ so-
cial networks.
The effects of a high-choice media environment are
mainly discussed over information about politics and
public issues; however, the relevance of science infor-
mation for society is increasingly acknowledged. Thus,
Scheufele and Krause (2019) demand urgent research on
the (mis/dis)information of scientific issues and analyses
of science communication in new media environments.
This article aims to contribute to this goal by consid-
ering Festinger’s (1957) Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(TCD), which can be seen as the root of research on selec-
tive exposure theory. A wide variety of empirical studies
has proven the assumption that online users turn primar-
ily to content that confirms their own attitudes (D’Alessio
& Allen, 2007; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2011).
Nevertheless, according to recent studies, users do not
necessarily turn away from content that contradicts or
challenges their attitudes (Garrett, 2017; Jang, 2014).
However, research on the processes of coping with dis-
sonance is still sparse.
Further, and this is quite new to research on cognitive
dissonance and for the field of science communication,
we will consider the emotional states and negotiations
of online users. Online and social media are discussed as
problematic due to their emotional-impulsive functional
logic that favours the spread of polarising and pointed
rhetoric (Eisenegger, 2017). This is related to the ratio-
nal argument, discourse, and deliberation perspective of
Habermas (1990) on public spheres and communication,
which is widespread in scholarly discussion. However, re-
cent concepts of ‘affective publics’ (Papacharissi, 2014)
have argued over the relevance of considering affects
because this allows focus on relational, processual, and
performative aspects, and thus provides broader under-
standing (Lünenborg, 2019).
According to the common perspective on rationality
and cognitive processes, prior studies in the field of dis-
sonance research typically focus on cognitive negotiation
whereby, according to the TCD, the emotional sensation
after reception plays an important role. The emotional
state of a human being can affect the accuracy of his or
her beliefs. In recent experimental work, it was found
that angry partisans who saw uncorrected political misin-
formation from their own party held less accurate beliefs
than emotionally neutral partisans. This raises concerns
that anger can facilitate belief in falsehoods (Scheufele
& Krause, 2019; Weeks, 2015). Emotional states, and
anger in particular, are assumed to interact with in-
dividual ideologies and the information environment—
such as the presence or absence of correctives—to influ-
ence how people encounter (mis/dis)information. Thus,
potentially exacerbating their beliefs in falsehoods and
shaping how (mis/dis)information is assimilated into
their own worldviews (Scheufele & Krause, 2019).
This study aims to shed light on questions over how
people are emotionally affected by online disinformation
andhow they copeby using different strategies for online
information.
2. Coping with Dissonance
In his TCD, Festinger (1957) assumes that people strive
for inner psychological consistency. Cognitive disso-
nance describes a person’s mental discomfort that is trig-
gered by a situation in which one is confrontedwith facts
that contradict his or her beliefs, ideals, and values. Basic
hypotheses of the TCD (Festinger, 1957, p. 3) are:
1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to re-
duce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to try-
ing to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situa-
tions and information which would likely increase the
dissonance.
Festinger assumes observable manifestations of these
pressures (Festinger, 1957). It is important to acknowl-
edge that the state of cognitive dissonance is an aver-
sivemotivational state of personal stress (Elliot & Devine,
1994; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Levy, 2015) and
it causes negative affect (Harmon-Jones, 2000a). Getting
into a dissonant state by being confronted with attitude-
inconsistent cognitions initially produces a negative
emotional reaction (Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013).
However, even though this imbalance is caused by a con-
flict on the cognitive level, experiencing this state en-
compasses the affective level, including a certain level
of arousal. These may vary individually and can arise
from the mere presence of a cognitive conflict or from
a self-threat, such as the perception that one is poorly
informed (Hart et al., 2009). Although cognitive dis-
crepancy and the resulting negative emotions are in-
teracting in the state of dissonance, one can analyti-
cally differentiate between behaviour that seeks to re-
duce the cognitive discrepancy and behaviour of cop-
ing with the negative emotional state (Harmon-Jones,
2000b). Surprisingly, although the idea that cognitive dis-
sonance can create an unpleasant feeling is central to
the TCD, this is mostly overlooked in research studies
(Harmon-Jones, 2000a). Therefore, this study will focus
on this emotional perspective.
Looking at information selection behaviour, the de-
sire for cognitive balance was assumed to induce people
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to expose themselves to certain types ofmedia content in
preference to others, which is well-known as selective ex-
posure hypothesis (D’Alessio & Allen, 2007). In particular,
the idea of confirmation-biased selective exposure has
long been discussed (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman,
2011). Where empirical studies have oftentimes con-
firmed the selective exposure towards congruent in-
formation, particularly regarding political issues, recent
studies have not confirmed the systematic avoidance of
incongruent information (Garrett, 2017; Jang, 2014).
However, most empirical research has been carried
out on an individual’s behaviour to avoid dissonance or
incongruent information. Donsbach (2007) has criticised
that previous research usually leaves open how people
actually handle a situation when confronted with incon-
gruent information, which mostly fails to take into ac-
count that dissonance only arises under these conditions.
That is why this study will focus on how people copewith
their state of dissonance. Individuals do not passively ac-
cept this negative state; instead, they engage in either
counter-arguments or search for ways to discount or ig-
nore the offending information (Festinger, 1957; Garrett
et al., 2013). If the individual is successful in these efforts,
and the contradiction between attitude and discrepant
evidence is resolved, an individual will feel rewarded or
relieved (Garrett et al., 2013). This was shown in a neuro-
science study, where areas of the brain associated with
pleasure were activated when the challenging informa-
tion was successfully equilibrated to an emotionally sta-
ble judgment (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, &Hamann,
2006, p. 1956). Thus, the negative emotional state trig-
gered by counter-attitudinal exposure tends to be short-
lived, and successful rejection of the challenge is emo-
tionally rewarding (Garrett et al., 2013).
However, research on the emotional dimension of be-
ing confronted with counter-attitudinal information and
becoming imbalanced is rare, and even more so is re-
search on how individuals cope with their dissonance,
particularly regarding emotional processes. This study fo-
cuses on these research questions in the context of ‘fake
news’ exposure. Consequently, this study is guided by
the following research questions:
RQ1: What affects do internet users have when con-
fronted with opinion-challenging disinformation?
RQ2: How do they cope with their state of
dissonance?
We will use the term ‘affect’ to cover the arousal and
valence of emotions. Whereas (psychological) research
has put much effort into theorising and differentiating
emotions and affects, it is often criticised that distinc-
tions between affect and emotion are untenable (in
communication and media studies; Lünenborg & Maier,
2018). Thus, affect and emotion are often considered
as synonymous (Lünenborg, Maier, & Töpper, 2018).
Particularly in research on media use and effects, af-
fect usually covers emotions and is discussed regard-
ing aspects of (de)arousal or (de)activation and valence,
such as varying degrees of positive-negative or pleasure–
displeasure (Konijn, 2013, p. 190;Wirth, 2013, p. 229), as
followed here.
Moreover, we will use the term of coping with dis-
sonance instead of reducing. With this, we highlight in-
terests in the processual perspective on individuals’ be-
haviour and their ways of dealing with psychological dis-
comfort (Diestel & Schmidt, 2011; Fogel, 2004).
For our research questions, the highly relevant pub-
lic issue of climate change is an appropriate context
as the phenomena of ‘fake news’/mis- and disinforma-
tion, filter bubbles, and polarisations are widely dis-
cussed on this issue (Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2012;
van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, &Maibach, 2017;
Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Hugo Lambert, 2015).
3. Methods
To explore emotional processes and coping strategies in
more depth than in previous research, this study trian-
gulates quantitative and qualitative methods in an inno-
vative research design through the use of surveys, eye
tracking, and a post-exposure walkthrough during retro-
spective interviews (see Figure 1).
In a laboratory setting, university students (n = 50,
aged between 19 and 38 years [M = 23.2; SD = 3.5],
mostly female [70%], see Supplementary File) were ex-
posed to a stimulus: a YouTube clip titled “The big CO2 lie
explained in 3minutes, simple and comprehensible,” pro-
duced by kla.tv (short for Klagemauer TV [Wailing Wall
TV]), that proclaims doubts about humans’ responsibil-
ity for causing climate change (Kla.tv., 2014). For exam-
ple, the so-called ‘Oregon Petition’ is presented, accord-
ing to which scientific research has not proven that high
amounts of CO2 contribute to global warming. This peti-
tion was rejected by the National Academy of Sciences in
theUS (TheNational Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, 1998). Moreover, the ‘Heidelberg Appeal’
is presented as a statement against man-made climate
change, although the Heidelberg Appeal is “a quiet call
for reason and a recognition of scientific progress as the
solution to, not the cause of, the health and environ-
mental problems that we face” (DeWeese, 2002). Kla.tv
(n.d.) introduces itself with “Klagemauer TV entlarvt
Retrospecve
interviews
DebrieﬁngSurvey tc
Internet
search
Survey tb
Smulus
exposure
Survey ta
Figure 1. Procedure of the study.
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 206–217 208
Verderben bringende Medienlügen und Lügenmedien!”
(“Wailing Wall TV exposes spoiling media lies and lie me-
dia!”), indicating a conspiracy background.
Subsequently, the participants were given 10 min-
utes to perform an internet search that was not re-
stricted to the issue of climate change. Standardised sur-
veys were conducted before the lab stage (ta: paper-
based, about two weeks before), directly after ‘fake
news’ exposure and before the online research (tb:
online), and after the online research (tc: online).
Here, we asked—inter alia—for climate change attitudes
(ta, tc). As emotions are at the centre of the research, this
study is mainly interested in affective attitude compo-
nents. Therefore, we will analyse an individual’s climate
change problem awareness (reduced scale of Taddicken
& Reif, 2016), first introduced by Taddicken (2013). For
measuring the immediate state of dissonance, we con-
ducted in tb positive and negative affects bymeans of the
German version (Breyer & Bluemke, 2016) of the widely
used Positive andNegative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scale
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It is supplemented by
three more items particularly interesting in this context.
The online research phase was recorded through an eye
tracking system. This recording was then used as a stim-
ulus for a post-exposure walkthrough. Participants were
asked at this stage to explain their choice of keywords
and web pages. These retrospective interviews lasted
between 11 and 30 minutes. Finally, a debriefing doc-
ument was given to the participants. In this document,
popular climate change denying arguments were briefly
discussed using parts of the IPCC report (BMU, UBA, &
German IPCC Coordination Unit, 2017).
To ensure that the stimulus was opinion-challenging
for participants, we excluded those who did not fully be-
lieve in human-made climate change. The final sample
size was n = 39.
The conducted survey data were used to calculate
different statistical tests (principal component analysis
[PCA], analysis of variance [ANOVA]). The transcripts
of the interviews were analysed qualitatively using a
deductive-inductive approach, starting with the method-
ology of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1999).
Following the guidelines of Corbin and Strauss (1990),
open coding was used first to identify conceptually per-
ceptions, actions, and emotions. They were grouped
together to form categories and subcategories. These
were then related to different stages during the online
research phase according to user-centred approaches
of information seeking (Kuhlthau, 1991) and, moreover,
to different stages of the process of coping with disso-
nances (Festinger, 1957).
4. Results
4.1. Research Question 1 on Affects
RQ1: What affects do internet users have when con-
fronted with opinion-challenging disinformation?
To answer RQ1, we looked at the data of the PANAS scale
first. Supplementary to the original 20 items were three
items interesting in this context: ‘confirmed’ as a positive
affect item and ‘confused’ and ‘insecure’ as negative af-
fect items.
Overall, the participants were more negatively af-
fected than positively, which is not surprising as the stim-
ulus was opinion-challenging and of negative tone.What
is interesting is the small difference between both af-
fect dimensions and the general level of affect, which
is below the middle of the five-point rating scale. The
items ‘irritable’ and ‘hostile’ of the negative dimension
show the highest scores of standard deviations, with an-
swers ranging from 1 to 5, meaning that some partici-
pants felt very irritable or hostile while others did not.
Thus, individual reactions to the stimulus varied widely
(see Supplementary File).
To explore these differences more deeply, we calcu-
lated a PCA to further differentiate the emotional states
of dissonance. Three different factors were identified:
anger, alarm, and activation (see Table 1). In this solu-
tion, three of the original positive affect items were not
included as their means and standard deviations were
both very low.
The first factor explaining the highest proportion of
variance is anger, with the highest loadings of feeling ‘ir-
ritable,’ ‘hostile,’ and ‘upset.’ The second factor is alarm,
with being ‘afraid,’ ‘nervous,’ and ‘insecure’ loading the
highest. Both factors are mixed between items of posi-
tive and negative affect of the original PANAS scale. The
third factor, activation, is composed of only positive af-
fect items, such as ‘active,’ ‘attentive,’ and ‘alert.’ The
originally positive affect item ‘strong’ loads on anger,
which indicates that participants felt angry but not weak
or defensive. The originally positive affect items ‘inter-
ested’ and ‘inspired’ load on alarm, which indicates that
the feeling of being alarmed by the disinformation also
seems to have some elements of curiosity.
In general, the means indicate a medium to low af-
fect level, even though being angry and feeling alarmed
by the stimulus is higher than the feeling of being acti-
vated by the video (see Table 2).
From these data, we do not know why some partici-
pants felt angry, alarmed or activated, and it remains un-
clearwhat explicitly caused the affective arousal: the pre-
sented content, the format, or the provider. To explore
this in more detail, the reconstructive interviews were
analysed. The interviews were held in German. Selected
citations were translated for this article.
Anger: This had the highest share in explained vari-
ances and it became clear that some individuals recog-
nised the stimulus as disinformation and this caused
avoidance:
Because this is bullshit. So….Because I simply don’t be-
lieve anything about it and just felt mucked about by
the presentation alone and just don’t want to listen to
such right-winged nonsense. (P35)
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Table 1. PCA of affect items.
Items Anger Alarm Activation
irritable (n) .868
hostile (n) .812
upset (n) .791
ashamed (n) .628
strong (p) .541 .449
confused * .465 .427
afraid (n) .688
nervous (n) .687
insecure * .638
jittery (n) .609
distressed (n) .579
interested (p) .560
inspired (p) .502 .428
scared (n) .500
active (p) .604
attentive (p) .598
alert (p) .443 .551
confirmed * .512
determined (p) .447 .497
guilty (n) .455
enthusiastic (p)
excited (p)
proud (p)
Eigenvalue 5.433 2.848 2.152
Explained variances 23.6% 12.4% 9.4%
Cronbach’s Alpha .820 .787 .723
Notes: Elbow criterion, varimax rotation, factors < .4 shown; explained variance 45.4%; p: positive, n: negative; * additional items.
Compared to the cognitive discrepancy, the affective
intensity of the dissonance experience becomes par-
ticularly obvious here. The stimulus was seen as hos-
tile content. In some cases, strong emotions were re-
vealed, even anger against the study itself which forced
the exposure:
First of all, I think I should have been warned that the
study might trigger certain emotions. Because I’m re-
ally a bit pissed off now…that people don’t realise that
this is actually total bullshit what they are saying. That
makes me really aggressive. (P45)
Participants felt annoyed by the idea that other people
could believe in the presented content. They showed
superior feelings towards these third persons with ‘the
more impressionable minds’ (known as third-person-
effect; Davison, 1983, p. 1). This goes along with the find-
ing that the affect item ‘strong’ belongs to this factor.
Alarm: Besides, participants were alarmed, and feel-
ings of uncertainty were expressed. Some individuals felt
irritated and insecure:
Um, it surprised me, and I…err…would have said
I didn’t believe it, but it made me think a little. (P56)
Individuals revealed feelings of nervousness about their
perceived insecurity:
And somehow she [the moderator] spoke like
that….I don’t know….It was like: Is she telling the truth
or not? I really wasn’t sure after the video how much
truth there is in that. (P29)
Table 2. Descriptives of the introduced affect dimensions.
Factors Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Anger 2.32 .801 1 4.13
Alarm 2.21 .649 1.33 4.22
Activation 2.03 .553 1.13 3.25
Note: n = 39.
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Activation: States of activationwere expressed as themo-
tivation to seek for more information and to learn more
about other perspectives on climate change:
And then she [the moderator] also gave facts and per-
centages…andum, the video definitelymademewant
to check things again. Because I don’t watch a video
and believe this to be the truth, but I want to see both
sides….And that’s why, yeah, I got active and thought,
I’ll look myself what the net has to say about it. (P48)
Overall, the feeling of imbalance after stimulus expo-
sure was ‘only’ medium to low; however, emotional re-
sponses were not only of a different kind, they were re-
lated to perceptions of different reference objects. Three
different factors of affects were identified: anger, alarm,
and activation. While overall anger was the dominant
emotion, the feeling of insecurity and helplessness led
to an alarmed state. Activated people mainly seemed cu-
rious about unknown and surprising arguments.
4.2. Research Question 2 on Coping
RQ2: How do they cope with their state of
dissonance?
According to Festinger’s (1957, pp. 19–22) original the-
ory, individuals can cope with their state of dissonance
through different strategies: (1) by adding consonant
conditions that reduce the overall level of inconsistency
and includes active attempts to seek out new informa-
tion; (2) by decreasing the importance of the elements
involved in the dissonant relations; or (3) by changing
one of the dissonance elements, either attitudes, values,
opinions, or behaviours (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm,
1995).Moreover, he assumes—when people are involun-
tarily confronted with information they would have nor-
mally avoided—(0) the “set up [of] quick defensive pro-
cesses which prevent the new cognition from ever be-
coming firmly established” (Festinger, 1957, p. 136).
In this study, strategies (1) and (2) are the ones to
favour from a normative perspective as these indicate
‘fake news resistance’—the same for (0) quick defence—
whereas (3) can be seen as democratically problematic.
Overall, participants used a variety of different key-
words for their searches, but most often started with
“Klimawandel” [climate change] or “Klimalüge” [lie about
climate change].
4.2.1. (0) Quick Defence
It is plausible to assume that many of the participants
used quick defensive processes to directly avoid the es-
tablishment of contra-anthropogenic climate change in-
formation. This might explain the relatively low level of
dissonance of some individuals directly after exposure.
Throughout the interviews, participants used the ex-
pression of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘conspiracy theory’ several
times and this often seemed to be connected to anger.
One individual revealed this as a quick defence argu-
ment, but added that searching for counter-arguments
was part of the coping strategy:
I instantly classified her [the moderator] as a conspir-
acy theorist…so my first search…was to look at all
these arguments….It’s always the same what the cli-
mate change opponents say. Um. Just to look again: Is
there perhaps something true about it? But, well…if
you already call it a conspiracy theory then it’s clear
that you’re just confirming your own knowledge. (P45)
4.2.2. (1) Adding Consonant Information
In line with this strategy, individuals add consonant con-
ditions to reduce the overall level of inconsistency, which
includes active attempts to seek out new and confirming
information.
While Germans generally perceive themselves to be
fairly knowledgeable about climate change (Taddicken,
Kohout, & Hoppe, 2019), specific details in the clip—
mainly the named ‘Heidelberg Appeal’ and the ‘Oregon
Petition’—caused a desire to seek more information.
Here, the participants obviously felt activated:
The researcher [the moderator] also talked about
this…the Oregon…or so. And then I was really inter-
ested in how these numbers came about. (P27)
However, in this study participants mainly confirmed
their attitudes with the help of reading already known
information. This strategy wasmainly confirming instead
of discovering, which might have resulted from their af-
fective state of anger. It is striking that participants were
able to clearly recognise this strategy within their own
behaviour and to explicitly express it:
I wanted to confirm that the information that was
shown is false and that my previous knowledge is
right. (P58)
Nevertheless, their defence motivation was satisfied by
their selection:
Um, and I got exactly the information that interested
me. So you can see that, like, 97 percent [who agree
to anthropogenic climate change] is a very large ma-
jority, which then, like, which I didn’t even know
until then. That encouraged me again, like, to see
that…there is not at all a fight in science, but that the
situation is actually quite clear. (P31)
In sum, the search for concrete information aims to clar-
ify and counter-argue the cited facts. This can be clas-
sified as a coping strategy with the aim to dissolve the
state of dissonance by trying to overcome the cognitive
discrepancy in the first place.
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4.2.3. (2) Decrease Dissonant Elements
The coping strategy of confirmingwas oftenmergedwith
the strategy of decreasing dissonant information:
Well, I wanted to see what the opposing voices are ac-
tually about and above all I wanted to have a closer
look at the proportion…because…I had the feeling
that, um, there’s a discrepancy. (P31)
In order to devalue dissonant elements, counter-
information can be actively sought and considered as
helpful when an individual believes he or she can easily
refute the information (Frey, 1981). This strategy was
clearly used by some subjects:
I didn’t want to hear any more opinions, I wanted to
knowwhat that Heidelberg Appeal or uprising orwhat
it was called was….And then I was confirmed, so my
opinionwas confirmed, that climate change exists and
that all these, apparently this Heidelberg Appeal thing
is a conspiracy theory, too, in the end. And then I was
actually satisfied with it. (P26)
Here, the refutation of dissonant information was used
to cope with the dissonance instead of the naive avoid-
ance of the given information. Confirmation that the pre-
sented information in the stimulus was not valuable pro-
duced a feeling of satisfaction and relief.
In contrast to those individuals who felt activated by
the stimulus and interested to find out more about the
contra-arguments, others were defensive and mainly or
even only interested in discounting the stimulus:
I have to say, I wasn’t really interested in the climate
thing. I didn’t…I didn’t feel like confirming that cli-
mate change is real. It didn’t make me feel like it at
all…because I knew therewas such a thing and Iwas re-
ally only interested in what kind of source it was. (P12)
Here, the coping strategy is to confirm one’s own view
by searching for information to discount the source’s
credibility. For this aim, content from the clip provider
on other public issues was screened, such as denial of
the Holocaust, which caused intense indignation with
a much higher level of emotional arousal. However, al-
though the success of the discounting was not perceived
as surprising it did cause a certain feeling of satisfaction.
Another feeling caused by the stimulus exposure was
amusement:
So, if I’d just seen it at home, I probably wouldn’t
have googled anything….At home I would have just
thought: Ok, honestly, I would have just laughed it
away. Maybe, and I think I also ticked [in the ques-
tionnaire] that I would share it. Maybe I’d even have
shared it with somebody, like: “Hey, look how funny
this is!” (P12)
This undermines the assumption that content—even
with regard to public science issues—is more likely
shared when it evokes surprise or disgust (Scheufele &
Krause, 2019; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).
In sum, the participants used coping strategies to re-
fute the stimulus content and discount its credibility. The
subjects were less concerned with the (objective) negoti-
ation of the cognitive discrepancy caused by any counter-
information. Their main focus was coping with the nega-
tive emotional state of dissonance, with feelings of relief
and satisfaction being disclosed if that succeeded.
4.2.4. (3) Changing Attitudes
Whereas the former coping strategies can lead to ‘fake
news resistance,’ the coping strategy of changing one
of the individual’s dissonance elements indicates a prob-
lematic consequence: when individuals change to lower
problem awareness. We first calculated repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. This determines that the means of the in-
dex of climate change problem awareness shows a statis-
tically significant difference between the measurements
(F(2, 74) = 8.324, p = .001). Looking at the single items,
themeans of three of the four items differed significantly
between the three different data points. Thus, the stim-
ulus exposure caused a significant decrease of problem
awareness. Although this rallies at data point three, the
means of problem awareness do not return to the initial
level (see Table 3). We did not measure problem aware-
ness after the reception of the debriefing document.
A power analysis was conducted with G*POWER
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The post-hoc
test for sensitivity for the repeated measures ANOVA
showed an effect size of f = .36 for 39 participants (𝛼 err
prob = .05, power = .80), with Critical F = 3.117, indicat-
ing a medium to large effect (Cohen, 1988).
To investigate how many participants changed their
affective attitude component problem awareness, we
calculated the individual differences over the three data
points to count the number of people with a decrease
in problem awareness (see Table 4). Half of the partici-
pants showed a decrease of problemawareness after the
stimulus reception (ta–tb). For almost half of the subjects
(17 of 38), this effect persists until after the research pe-
riod (albeit reduced, cf. level of differences).
This result was surprising because we assumed par-
ticipants would be mainly resistant. Therefore, we ex-
plored this more deeply by analysing the retrospective
interviews of people with a permanent decrease in prob-
lem awareness over the three data points. Different
search intentions and behaviours were found in this
group of participants.
It became clear that some individuals felt lost in their
state of dissonance as they tried to seek out objective
information, but were not sure over how to exactly find
the information. Participant P04 is a good example: She
wanted to “find out if this is really such an alleged lie”
and was “trying to find anything scientific about it.” She
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Table 3. Repeated measurement of climate change problem awareness.
ta: before the tb: directly after tc: after the internet
exposure the exposure research
Item Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F p
Climate change problem awareness. 4.55 (.526) 4.34 (.696) 4.34 (.608) 8.324 .001
Climate change will have a major impact 4.77 (.427) 4.42 (.858) 4.72 (.510) 5.074 .009
on humans’ lives in the future.
Climate change is a threat to the Earth. 4.56 (.882) 4.26 (1.107) 4.33 (1.009) 6.000 .004
Climate change is one of the biggest 4.54 (.643) 4.32 (.739) 4.36 (.707) 2.156 .123
challenges for humanity.
Climate change worries me. 4.26 (.938) 3.97 (.915) 3.97 (.932) 4.098 .021
Cronbach’s Alpha .655 .758 .728
Notes: n = 38–39; differences calculated with repeated measures ANOVA; response scale from 1 (‘do not agree at all’) to 5 (‘to-
tally agree’).
felt insecure about climate change, but also about how
to search for the desired information: “I didn’t really
know how to approach the search” (P04). She often fol-
lowed recommendations of the used search engine or
other platforms, but was mostly dissatisfied with the
search results. She glanced over several websites instead
of reading some parts more carefully. She had the aim
“to search neutrally,” which led to an excessive demand
and the feeling of helplessness. In the end, this partici-
pant still felt ambivalent about the issue (P04).
Another pattern was observed within this group. P08
is taken as an extreme case. She had the highest decrease
of problem awareness of thewhole sample (difference tc
to ta = 2.0, tb to ta = 2.5 on the five-point-rating scale).
She had no clear research strategy but presented a high
level of curiosity. She sought out surprising information
with a certain uniqueness and alternative positions to tra-
ditional news media. Generally, she expressed a high in-
terest in conspiracy theories and felt bored by things al-
ready known:
Hmm….Yeah, well, I’m really interested in conspiracy
theories. I would have liked to read something about
it somehow….Like where in a way something comes
out that you would not have expected. Like what
I have read now, it already sounded familiar to me,
like what you always hear. (P08)
A high level of attraction of surprising information is clear
here. This goes along with the findings of Vosoughi et al.
(2018), who identified in their big Twitter study that false
stories inspired fear, disgust, and surprise in replies, and
suggested that these were more likely shared because
they were more novel.
What P08 and P04 have in common is that they
both felt insecure because they were unable to fulfil
their information desires and finish the coping process.
They were unable to dissolve their inner state of tension
through the use ofmedia.Where P08 did not feel uncom-
fortable with the situation, P04 felt dissatisfied. This dif-
ference might be caused by different personality traits,
such as tolerance of uncertainty or need for cognition,
and/or differentmotivations such as the level of accuracy
(Hart et al., 2009).
In sum, different coping strategies following
Festinger’s original theory could be identified here, al-
though these were sometimes merged. A key strategy
was to confirm one’s former opinion on the existence
of anthropogenic climate change by re-reading already
known information instead of searching for new evi-
dence. This helped to overcome cognitive discrepancies.
Another dominant strategy was to seek out informa-
tion about specific details named in the stimulus clip.
The retrospective interviews disclosed that it was of-
ten done with the aim to refute the claims, such as to
discount the source’s credibility. In this way they suc-
ceeded in dissolving the negative emotional state of dis-
sonance. Quite unexpected, many subjects also used the
strategy of changing their view—meaning their climate
change problem awareness decreased—although this
Table 4. Changes in problem awareness in absolute numbers of participants.
Problem awareness ta–tb tb–tc ta–tc
Constant 14 20 16
Increased 5 13 5
Decreased 19 5 17
Note: n = 38.
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trend weakened after the internet research phase. We
further investigated those with a stable decrease and
found two different patterns: the feeling of frustration
and helplessness due to a lack of media literacy, and a
feeling of sensation and attraction of surprising informa-
tion and alternative worldviews.
5. Limitations
Somemethodological shortcomings must be considered.
First, the participants were students and thus the sample
is younger, more educated, and more trained in internet
usage than the German average. This might explain the
relatively high level of reflected self-assessments even
though this helped to gain deeper insights. As the stimu-
lus exposure and internet research was carried out in the
lab questions of external validitymay arise. However, the
lab was designed to be as comfortable as possible and
the time given for the research process was relatively
long in order to provide the most natural surroundings
possible. Although we conducted post-exposure walk-
through interviews and were able to combine overt be-
haviour with retrospective self-assessments, we were
not able to conduct unconscious behaviour and may
have forced ex post sense-making processes. Finally, we
were not fully successful in provoking the feeling of dis-
sonance. On the one hand this is a clear limitation of our
analyses, which ties in with a former critique of cogni-
tive dissonance research (Donsbach, 2007) and should
be considered with more attention in future studies. On
the other hand, it is also a major finding of this study to
confirm that climate change is a non-quested public issue
in Germany (BMU & UBA, 2019; Engels, Hüther, Schäfer,
& Held, 2013). It would be interesting to repeat the study
with other science issues that have not been on the pub-
lic agenda for so long and are perceived to be more am-
bivalent. Finally, some ethical concerns must be consid-
ered. Although the debriefing was an important compo-
nent of method design, we did not measure its effect.
Some participants showed a relatively strong emotional
involvement during the exposure, but this was resolved
in subsequent interviews.
6. Conclusion
With this study, we aimed to explore what affects
internet users have when confronted with opinion-
challenging disinformation and how they cope with their
state of dissonance during an internet search. With this,
we turned the usual research questions related to disso-
nance avoidance and confirmation biased-selection be-
haviour around. While prior research has often analysed
how people perceive online disinformation to confirm
their attitudes, the question of how users react when be-
ing confronted with opinion-challenging disinformation
has been overlooked. As this is likely to happen in an
online environment that can be called “dissonant pub-
lic spheres” (Pfetsch, Löblich, & Eilders, 2018), this is
highly relevant. Whether or not users are ‘fake news re-
sistant,’ meaning that online disinformation does not be-
come affective in their opinion-formation processes, is
seen to be a major societal challenge in the near future
(Garrett, 2017).
Here, we aimed to focus on affects during exposure
and coping behaviours. For this, we used an innovative,
multidimensional research design which proved to be
useful. It became clear that affective arousals as well as
coping strategies varied individually and that overt be-
haviour has to be regarded against the background of in-
dividual ideas and motivations: for example, that search-
ing for counter-arguments might be motivated by believ-
ing in an easy refutation of them. Confirming neurosci-
entific findings, we found that individuals felt relieved
and satisfied after being able to dissolve their dissonant
state and negative arousal. We also found dissatisfaction
and frustration if this had not succeeded. It seems im-
portant over whether individuals were able to complete
their coping process or not. Thus, unfinished coping pro-
cesses might be an explanation for disenchantment with
the media as well as with scientific elites. The high rele-
vance of an adequate level of media and internet literacy
is highlighted by this finding.
We were not able to analyse the effects of the disin-
formation stimulus inmore detail in this article. However,
the (short-lived) decrease of the affective attitude of
problem awareness urges further analyses. Where some
individuals seemed to be ‘fake news resistant’, others
were not. Individual characteristics, such as curiosity and
openness towards alternative ideas, should be investi-
gated more deeply in this context. Further research on
different typologies will be helpful when thinking about
how to counteract campaigns of (mis/dis)information on
science issues (Iyengar & Massey, 2019).
In addition, it seems worthwhile to analyse the rela-
tionship between the various coping strategies and selec-
tion behaviour. Thus, identifying the information sources
primarily used to confirm previous opinion and which
ones are used to find additional—and devaluating—
information about the content provider. This would also
include the search terms used and how relevant they
are, as well as search engine hit lists for the selection
of websites. For example, is information from NGOs sys-
tematically avoided and traditional journalistic informa-
tion preferred? What role does social media play (Huber,
Barnidge, Gil de Zúñiga, & Liu, 2019)? These and similar
questions should be answered in the future.
This study has shown how important future in-depth
research is to identifying individual processes of coping
with affective arousal when being confronted with disin-
formation on science issues.
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